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THE MYTHS OF MACPHERSON  
 
John C. P. Goldberg† and Benjamin C. Zipursky††  
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
  
In 1910, Donald MacPherson bought a new Buick Runabout from Close Brothers, a 
dealership in upstate New York. A year later, he was seriously injured when the car veered 
off the road as he drove it. MacPherson sued Buick for negligence. His suit alleged that 
Buick was careless in marketing a car with a wheel containing a latent defect, which caused 
the wheel to crumble and the car to crash. After a verdict for MacPherson was affirmed by 
an intermediate appellate court,1 Buick appealed to New York’s high court. 
 Buick’s hopes for reversal rested mainly on English and New York precedents that 
had set limits on the classes of persons to whom manufacturers owed a duty of care. The 
most significant of these was Winterbottom v. Wright, decided by the English Exchequer Court 
in 1842.2 Wright had contracted with the English Postmaster General to provide a coach for 
use in mail delivery along a certain route. The horses and drivers for the coach were 
provided to the Postmaster General by a third party named Atkinson. Winterbottom, a 
driver hired by Atkinson, was seriously injured when the coach overturned. Winterbottom 
sued Wright, claiming that Wright had acted carelessly in providing the Postmaster General 
with an unsound coach. The English court rejected Winterbottom’s claim, establishing what 
would come to be known as the “privity” rule. Wright’s duty to take care to provide sound 
coaches, the court reasoned, was owed only to the Postmaster General. As to downstream 
users such as Winterbottom, Wright owed no duty of care.  
 Other precedents cut against Buick on the duty issue. The New York Court of 
Appeals’ 1852 decision in Thomas v. Winchester involved the sale of a bottle containing poison 
that had been mislabeled by the manufacturer so as to indicate that it contained medicine.3 
                                                      
† Eli Goldston Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. 
†† James H. Quinn Professor, Fordham University School of Law. We are delighted to revisit 
MacPherson v. Buick on the occasion of its centenary. Some arguments made herein are elaborations 
of those made in our first co-authored article. John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The 
Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733 (1998). Thanks to Professor Anthony Sebok and the 
AALS Torts Section’s Executive Committee for inviting us to participate on this panel, and to our 
fellow panelists. Thanks also to Andrew Gold and John Witt for helpful comments. Our research is 
generously supported by Fordham University School of Law and Harvard Law School. 
1 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 160 A.D. 55 (N.Y. App. Div. 1914), aff’d, 111 N.E. 1050 
(N.Y. 1916). 
2 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). 
3 6 N.Y. 397 (1852). Whether the substance—belladonna—that poisoned Thomas is fairly 
characterized as a “poison” rather than a “medicine” is a more delicate question than first appears, 
given that belladonna had and has medicinal uses. It is, however, toxic when used in doses 
appropriate to the substance identified on the bottle’s label (extract of dandelion). 
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The plaintiff ingested the substance—belladonna—only after it was sold to her husband 
through intermediaries. Thomas reasoned that mislabeled poisons pose a special kind of 
danger, hence a duty was owed to the ultimate consumer notwithstanding the lack of privity 
between manufacturer and consumer. Subsequent Court of Appeals decisions declined to 
apply the privity rule to various products, including a scaffold erected for the use of workers 
in painting a building, a glass bottle containing aerated water, and a large coffee urn.4   
 In MacPherson, the Court of Appeals ruled 6-1 to affirm the jury’s verdict for the 
plaintiff.5 Cardozo’s majority opinion teased out from the precedents a general rule of duty 
for manufacturers far broader than Winterbottom’s. Under this rule—which Cardozo deemed 
applicable only to products that endanger life or limb, and that are not likely to be inspected 
for safety after their initial sale—a manufacturer owes a duty of care to all persons within the 
class of persons who would probably be among those injured if the product were carelessly made.   
 Applying the rule to the facts of the case, Cardozo concluded that Buick owed a duty 
of care to MacPherson. Physical harm to an occupant of a mass-manufactured automobile 
capable of speeds of 55 miles per hour was a probable outcome of a manufacturer’s careless 
failure to ensure its vehicles were free of latent defects in key components. Moreover, 
dealers and consumers could not be expected to identify such defects on their own. 
Therefore a duty was owed by Buick to such persons, irrespective of privity. Given the jury’s 
finding that Buick had breached this duty by failing adequately to test the wheel and had 
thereby caused MacPherson to be injured, Buick was liable to MacPherson for negligence. 
  MacPherson has called forth from judges and academics many of the laudatory 
adjectives used to describe important cases: canonical, iconic, and mythical. In this paper we 
want to focus on the “mythical.” Regrettably, a good deal of scholarship on MacPherson has 
fostered myths about the decision. Three in particular will serve as our focus. The first 
concerns the concept of duty in negligence law. The second concerns common law 
reasoning. The third concerns the relationship of negligence to strict products liability.   
Part I describes the myths, which we expect will be familiar to torts scholars and 
other legal academics. Part II identifies what renders each myth mythical and then advances 
a better account of duty, judicial reasoning, and the relationship between negligence and 
products liability. Part III explains why it is critical that we get over the myths of MacPherson, 
explaining the damage they have done to modern tort law, notwithstanding that MacPherson 
itself was an engine of commendable change. A century after the fact, it is all the more 
important to be clear on what the great case of MacPherson v. Buick actually stands for. 
 
I.  MACPHERSON : STANDARD ACCOUNTS 
    
 A. Impersonal Duties, Not Relational Duties  
 As a matter of formal legal doctrine, the issue posed by MacPherson was one of “duty.” 
So says Cardozo’s opinion at the outset: “The question to be determined is whether the 
                                                      
4 Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470 (1882) (scaffold); Torgesen v. Schultz, 84 N.E. 956, 957 (N.Y. 
1908) (aerated water); Statler v. George A. Ray Mfg. Co., 88 N.E. 1063 (N.Y. 1909) (coffee urn). 
5 MacPherson v. Buick, 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
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defendant owed a duty of care and vigilance to any one but the immediate purchaser.”6 
Crucially, this question is framed relationally. It asks whether Buick owed it to someone other 
than its dealers to take care to make its cars safe. Implicit in this framing is the possibility 
that, for some persons injured by Buick’s carelessness, there would be no liability because 
the company owed them no duty of care.   
 Despite having so framed the question, Cardozo is usually praised for not taking it at 
face value. Indeed, he is praised for being ‘ahead of the curve’ in recognizing that a relational 
notion of legal duty makes no sense for a body of tort law meant to govern a populous 
modern society characterized by routine interactions among strangers.7 Law for the modern 
world, it is supposed, is law that recognizes that the duty of care in negligence law does not 
attach to relationships (personal, contractual, or otherwise) but to individuals and their actions. 
In short, it is a simple, nonrelational duty—a duty to act with reasonable care, full stop.8 
 Of course negligence liability was and is regularly imposed as a result of interactions 
between persons who are not strangers. A doctor can be held liable to a patient for 
malpractice, and a business can be held liable to a client for an injury caused by its unsafe 
premises. Yet, even in these cases—according to the mythmakers—the relationship is not 
necessary for the existence of the duty of care and it is not the source of the duty, either. 
Whether interacting with a client or a stranger, one’s duty is always the same. It is not a duty 
owed to any persons in particular; it is a duty owed to the state or to the world. MacPherson, 
on this reading, rightly rejected the privity limit because it rightly rejected the idea that a legal actor’s 
duty of care is relational – owed to a person or members of a class of persons.     
 And yet if Cardozo did adopt a simple, nonrelational conception of duty, an 
interpretive puzzle arises. Recall that the issue Cardozo posed at the outset of his opinion is 
whether Buick owed a duty of care to a person such as MacPherson. If the duty of care is a 
simple duty to act reasonably, there is no point in asking this question, for the only possible 
answer is “yes.” The duty of care, conceived as a simple duty, is owed to everyone. Given 
this conception, it would be incoherent to suppose that a negligence claim against Buick 
could fail because Buick owed no duty to take care in the manufacturing of its cars. A simple 
duty of care is always present, always owed. 
 Why, then, did Cardozo seem to suppose that there was something meaningful to talk 
about under the heading of “duty”? An answer to this puzzle was most famously proffered 
twenty-five years later by William Prosser, the leading torts scholar of the mid-Twentieth 
Century. According to Prosser: 
 
The statement that there is or is not a duty begs the essential question—whether the 
plaintiff’s interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant’s conduct. …  
                                                      
6 Id. at 1051. 
7 See, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 125 
(Expanded ed. 2003); Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation, 
15 GA. L. REV. 925, 936-38 (1981). 
8 This conception of duty, advocated prominently in Holmes’s writings, would later be endorsed 
by Prosser and many others. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note ††, at 1752-66 (laying out 
Holmes’s and Prosser’s views).   
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It is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis itself.  …. 
“[D]uty” is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those 
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is 
entitled to protection.9 
 
The duty question cannot, on a nonrelational conception, be a question about whether the 
defendant owed it to the plaintiff to take care. But it does not follow that there is nothing for 
judges to consider under the heading of “duty.”  Instead, judges could pose for themselves a 
different question: whether policy considerations favor or disfavor the negligence claims of a 
certain class of plaintiffs against a certain class of defendants.   
 Looking back, Prosser argued, this is exactly what had happened in Winterbottom. The 
English judges framed their ruling as a no-duty ruling, yet the outcome in that case rested on 
their underlying judgment that (in the words of Lord Abinger) “the most absurd and 
outrageous consequences” would result if anyone injured by a carelessly made product could 
sue the manufacturer.10 Winterbottom’s no-duty ruling, like all no-duty rulings, is best 
understood as a judicial grant of an exemption from the default rule that liability will attach 
when one person carelessly injures another. Winterbottom never denied that manufacturers 
were under some duty to take care that their products not injure others. After all, those in 
privity could recover for their product-related injuries. Rather it had adopted a policy-based 
limit on the aggregate liability facing manufacturers; one that, in the name of the greater 
good, blocked many victims of careless conduct from recovering damages. 
 According to Prosser and others, one of Cardozo’s great achievements in MacPherson 
was to perceive that the reduction of the morally tinged duty issue to a question of public 
policy need not have the regressive valence given to it by decisions such as Winterbottom. 
Indeed, the deconstruction of duty promised to liberate judges to remake negligence law in a 
more progressive mold. To appreciate—as Cardozo is said to have appreciated—that duty is 
“not sacrosanct in itself” is to recognize that everything turns on the underlying policy 
question. What a judge faced with a duty question needs to determine is whether there are 
compelling reasons to insulate manufacturers from liability for injuries caused by their 
carelessly made products. Even if a broad exemption might have been warranted for 
manufacturers in 1842, by 1916 it was not. If anything, by the latter date there were powerful 
reasons of deterrence and compensation to hold Buick and other manufacturers liable. If 
duty is policy, and policy factors favor liability for negligence, then judges had no reason to 
provide manufacturers with the protection of the privity rule.  
  
 B. Legislation, Not Adjudication  
 Negligence cases like Winterbottom and MacPherson seem in the first instance to deal 
with “private” matters. These are disputes between an injurer and a victim that call for an 
                                                      
9 WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 31, at 180 (1941). 
10 Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (Ex. 1842); PROSSER, supra note 9, § 31, at 
179 (arguing that mid-nineteenth century English courts developed the concept of relational duty to 
limit liability of nascent industry); id. § 83, at 674 (discussing the policy rationale for limiting liability 
of product sellers). 
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adjudication of the rights and duties of each. Broader questions as to the social value or 
significance of validating or rejecting the plaintiff’s complaint at best lurk in the background. 
 The standard account of MacPherson praises Cardozo for having moved beyond a 
private-law conception of tort so as to grasp the centrality to tort law of its “public” 
dimension.11 Of course the Court of Appeals was most immediately faced with deciding 
whether Buick was required to pay damages to MacPherson. But in answering that question, 
the Court was setting out a rule regulating manufacturer behavior and determining the ability 
of consumers to obtain compensation for product-related injuries. Cardozo, it is said, 
recognized that the adjudicative task facing the Court of Appeals—deciding Buick’s liability to 
MacPherson—boiled down to the legislative task of fashioning a rule that would properly 
incentivize manufacturers, or would provide appropriate compensation to persons injured by 
poorly made products.  
 For these reasons, MacPherson has been cast as an important instance of a 
sophisticated, modern judge recognizing that tort law is really a species of public law. Judges 
presiding over tort cases are not village elders who gather to ponder how neighbors ought to 
treat one another. They are government officials charged with attending to the public 
welfare. More than anything else, tort law is a delegation of power to judges (and juries) to 
issue rules and regulations that can be expected to redound to the public good, either 
because the threat of tort liability will deter unsafe, antisocial conduct, or because tort 
liability will help injury victims shift the cost of their losses to others who, for one reason or 
another, ought to bear those losses. Just as Winterbottom was a conscious or semi-conscious 
effort at legislating laissez faire, MacPherson, the thinking goes, turned on Cardozo’s quite 
deliberate rejection of that policy in favor of a more progressive, consumer-protective policy. 
 This perspective on MacPherson was fueled in part by the famous set of lectures that 
Cardozo later gave at Yale Law School.12 In The Nature of the Judicial Process, Cardozo candidly 
acknowledged the role of discretion in appellate adjudication and the need for judges to look 
beyond precedents to reach sensible decisions in contested cases. Seen in this light, 
MacPherson is taken to epitomize the triumph of a functionalist approach to adjudication over 
a formalistic conception of adjudication as a mere exercise in logic. A formalistic judge might 
have supposed that MacPherson could and should be resolved by a divination of the true 
meaning of the phrase “inherently dangerous,” or by an arid exercise in analogy. (Are cars 
more like coaches and steam boilers, or more like medicines, scaffolds, and coffee urns?) 
Cardozo, it is supposed, recognized that any such exercise was of limited value and that the 
case before the Court posed the question of whether, in light of the social realities of 
manufacturer-consumer transactions, it would be useful and fair to hold car manufacturers 
liable for carelessness causing injury to consumers.  
 Relatedly, MacPherson is said to have discarded an older conception of common law in 
favor of a more modern and more plausible conception. On a traditional understanding of 
common law’s authority, the rules and principles announced by judges in the course of 
                                                      
11 RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 108-09 (1990); Leon Green, Tort 
Law Public Law in Disguise (Part I), 38 TEX. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1938) (emphasizing the “policies that lie 
at the base of the decision”).  
12 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). 
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deciding particular disputes claim authority for the general population in large part because 
those rules and principles roughly track prevailing social norms. Judge-made common law 
could demand allegiance only insofar as it embodies longstanding custom; its rules could 
then claim to be rules that members of society already held ‘in common.’ Conversely, judicial 
decisions that were out in front of conventional norms, or flouted them, would expose 
judge-made law to criticism for being illegitimate.  
 Modern society’s increasing heterogeneity undermined this effort to link the common 
law’s legitimacy to its incorporation of prevailing norms. No longer could judge-made law be 
justified as reflexively applying rules already to some degree recognized in everyday life. 
Instead, if there were any justification for the imposition of law by judges, as opposed to 
democratically elected legislatures or expert regulators, it would have to be that judges were 
capable of making sensible policy decisions. MacPherson was a testament to this possibility. 
Cardozo adopted a rule grounded in a plausible conception of what courts could and should 
do to improve product safety without overburdening manufacturers. The legitimacy of his 
decision rested on its soundness as a piece of regulatory policy.  
 
 C. The Continuity between MacPherson  and Strict Products Liability 
 The third of our three myths pertains to the significance of MacPherson for the 
development of tort law and tort theory. It can be stated as follows. Even though MacPherson 
was a negligence decision, in retrospect it can been understood as setting out an embryonic 
form of the doctrine of strict products liability. MacPherson, the thought goes, reflected a 
progressive and pragmatic appreciation of the need to adjust negligence doctrine to achieve 
the goals of tort law in the domain of product-related injuries. The law of products liability 
that emerged in the 1960s emerged for just the same reasons. MacPherson eliminated the 
regressive formality of privity. Landmark products liability decisions such as Escola and 
Greenman,13 along with Section 402A of the Second Torts Restatement,14 stripped away 
additional formalities—especially the notice requirements of warranty law, and the 
negligence requirement of proving not only the presence of a defect in the injury-generating 
product but also the careless conduct that generated the defect—that had impeded tort law’s 
ability to achieve its compensatory and deterrent purposes. 
 The claim that MacPherson’s practical significance resides in its having served as a 
forerunner of strict products liability is not difficult to find. Torts casebooks overwhelmingly 
present the decision in just this manner.15 That they do so is hardly surprising. Indeed, 
Justice Roger Traynor’s famous concurrence in Escola—the opinion that paved the way for 
the adoption of strict products liability—explicitly invoked MacPherson as a key precedent.16 
For his part, Traynor doubtless was pleased to remind those who might be skeptical of his 
                                                      
13 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods. Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling 
Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 465 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). 
14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
15 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 
720 (10th ed. 2012); MARC A. FRANKLIN, ET AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 551 (9th ed. 2011); VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S 
TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 746 (12th ed. 2010). 
16 Escola, 150 P.2d 436, 465 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). 
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proposed doctrinal revision that a member of the American judicial pantheon had largely 
made his reputation on a ‘comparable’ revision. More substantively, Traynor seems to have 
understood MacPherson as supporting his mission to replace an older, abstract, and 
confiningly moralistic approach to tort law, represented by Winterbottom, for a modern, 
engaged, pragmatic approach, supposedly epitomized by MacPherson.   
 Twenty years later, writing for the majority in the Greenman case—among the first 
decisions overtly holding a manufacturer liable on a tort theory of strict products liability—
Traynor no longer needed to invoke Macpherson, but instead could merely cite to his Escola 
opinion to confirm the emergence of an instrumental approach to liability for product-
related injuries:  
 
We need not recanvass the reasons for imposing strict liability on the manufacturer. 
They have been fully articulated in the cases cited above. (See also 2 Harper and 
James, Torts, ss 28.15-28,16, pp. 1569-1574; Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer, 
69 Yale L.J. 1099; Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 
436, concurring opinion.) The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of 
injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put 
such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to 
protect themselves. Sales warranties serve this purpose fitfully at best. (See Prosser, 
Strict Liability to the Consumer, 69 Yale L.J. 1099, 1124-1134.)17   
  
The claim that MacPherson morphed almost effortlessly into Escola, Greenman and 
Section 402A rests in part on Cardozo’s insistence that liability for product-related injuries 
must be seen as a matter of tort, not contract. The absence of a contract between 
Winterbottom and Wright had doomed Winterbottom’s claim: if Winterbottom had wanted 
protection against the risk of injury, he should have (in Baron Alderson words) “made 
himself a party to the contract.”18 MacPherson changed all this. Consumers no longer needed 
to contract for protection against product-related injuries, and manufacturers could no 
longer avoid liability by structuring their affairs to avoid contracting directly with consumers. 
Decades later, Traynor seized on this aspect of MacPherson to explain why the warranties of 
quality that had previously been understood to be contractual in nature should no longer be 
limited by the formalities of the “law of sales.” Warranties of safety may have started off as 
creatures of contract, but like the duty of care in negligence, they were no longer to be based 
on contract, but instead were grounded in the law. 
 Moreover, while MacPherson was, of course, an application of the law of negligence, 
Cardozo seemed to have implicitly recognized that the notion of “fault” at work in tort law 
is sufficiently capacious as to blur, if not efface, not only the line between negligence and 
strict liability, but also between liability understood as backward-looking accountability for 
wrongdoing (on the one hand) and liability understood as a means of regulating behavior in 
a forward-looking effort to achieve deterrence and compensation (on the other).  
                                                      
17 Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901. 
18 Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 E.R. 402, 405 (Ex. 1842).  
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The judgment for MacPherson obviously rested in part on a jury finding, affirmed by 
the Court of Appeals, that Buick had been careless. But if there was ‘fault,’ it was arguably 
not fault in the sense of a moral wrong. Buick purchased its wheels from a reputable 
manufacturer, and it road-tested each of its cars once assembled. At trial, experts for the 
plaintiff asserted that additional testing would have led to the discovery of the defective 
wheel, but the evidence on this point was hardly overwhelming.19 Decisions such as 
MacPherson demonstrated that, in practice, negligence law’s conception of fault permits juries 
to impose liability more or less as they see fit. Strict products liability could thus be seen as 
but a candid acknowledgment of the point that, in the domain of product-related injuries, 
liability is not best understood as redress for wrongs, and that, instead, liability should be 
understood primarily as a means of achieving loss-spreading and deterrence.20 
 The emerging regulatory conception of product liability law went hand-in-hand with 
the idea that, in a modern economy, “consumer protection” is one of government’s basic 
duties. On this point, too, MacPherson is cast as being a cutting-edge decision. When it comes 
to mass-produced, mass-marketed goods, it says, the consumer is not in a position to protect 
himself from product dangers – he will not be testing the soundness of his car’s wheels – 
and instead relies on the expertise and diligence of manufacturers to produce suitably safe 
products. In these circumstances, consumers are not only entitled to look to sellers to 
protect them against product dangers, they are entitled to look to the law to ensure that there 
is such protection. Again, the issue is not so much accountability for wrongdoing but how 
law can be harnessed to help ensure that products sold in the commercial marketplace 
actually are safe.   
 
* * * 
 
 To sum up the key claims of this part: MacPherson is typically lauded as marking the 
emergence and indeed triumph of a modern, realistic understanding of tort law and 
common-law adjudication. Looking past the misleading language of duty, Cardozo is said to 
have recognized that the real ‘duty’ question facing courts is whether to grant a policy-based 
exception to the ordinary operation of negligence law. Grasping that private disputes are 
really occasions for appellate courts to make regulatory policy, and rejecting the fiction that 
law is found, not made, he is alleged to have fashioned a rule grounded in a sensible policy 
                                                      
19 James Henderson, Jr., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company: Simplifying the Facts While 
Reshaping the Law, in TORT STORIES 41, 43-44, 47-48 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 
2003). 
20 W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 98, at 692-93 (5th ed. 1984) 
(identifying loss-spreading, deterrence and legal process/burden of proof considerations as the three 
policies served by strict products liability). In an offhand remark in his landmark article on causation, 
Guido Calabresi suggested that MacPherson should be understood as driven by “market deterrence or 
compensation goals.” Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, 
Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 95 n. 36 (1975). Overt regulation by state government officials of certain 
aspects of automobile safety—including requirements for headlights and windshield glass—were 
underway in the 1920s and 30s.  See Sally H. Clarke, Unmanageable Risks: MacPherson v. Buick and the 
Emergence of a Mass Consumer Market, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 42-44 (2005).  
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rationale. Eschewing facile moralism, and attuned to the emerging reality of the modern, 
regulatory state, he is credited with recognizing that the key question with respect to liability 
for product-related injuries is not whether somebody has committed a wrong, but whether 
and how liability might achieve compensation and deterrence.  
 
II.  MACPHERSON  WITHOUT MYTHS 
  
 Though widely embraced today, the foregoing accounts of MacPherson rest on an 
interrelated series of misunderstandings about Cardozo’s opinion, negligence law, tort law, 
and law generally.      
  
 A.  Relational Duty   
 It is more than a little strange to read into MacPherson the notion that legal duties must 
be understood as running to government, or to the public at large, or to no one at all. As 
noted above, Cardozo’s opinion began by framing the question facing the Court of Appeals 
as whether a duty of care was owed by a manufacturer to members of certain classes of persons not 
in privity with the manufacturer. And his answer to that question was not that manufacturers owe 
a duty of care to the world at large. Instead, his opinion reasoned that manufacturers owe a 
duty to the persons whose life or limb probably would be endangered were their products 
carelessly made. Indeed, he crisply articulated his understanding of the duty element and the 
privity problem in a manner that made relationality central:  “There is nothing anomalous in 
a rule which imposes upon A, who has contracted with B, a duty to C and D and others 
according as he knows or does not know that the subject matter of the contract is intended 
for their use.”21 
 The notion that MacPherson stands for the embrace of a simple, nonrelational 
conception of duty rests on a conflation of three ideas. We label these, respectively:  
 
(i) relationality (the idea that duties of care are owed to persons or members of classes 
of persons); 
(ii) relationship-sensitivity (the idea that the scope, and in some circumstances, the 
existence, of a duty of care will turn on the relationship between the persons in 
question); and 
(iii) relationship-dependence (the idea that no duty of care is owed by one person to another 
unless there is a contract or a pre-existing status-based relationship between them).  
 
With these ideas pulled apart, it quickly becomes clear that one can reject (iii) without 
rejecting (i) or (ii). The fact that negligence law recognizes duties of care running between 
and among strangers does not establish that these duties are nonrelational in their analytic 
structure.  Nor does it establish that preexisting relationships between injurer and victim are 
irrelevant to the existence and scope of the tort duties one owes another.   
 On the standard account of MacPherson, it broke from the older notion of negligence 
as involving the breach of a relationship-based duty in favor of a modern notion of 
                                                      
21 MacPherson v. Buick, 111 N.E. 1050, 1054 (N.Y. 1916) (emphasis added). 
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negligence marked by the recognition of a simple, always applicable, duty of care that runs 
among strangers. There are many problems with this account, not the least of which is that it 
relies on bad history. The idea of tort duties running between strangers was hardly unknown 
to pre-modern law. The eminent historian J.H. Baker reports English cases from as far back 
as the 1400s in which a property owner is held liable for undertaking an activity on his 
property that injures a passerby.22 Whatever was erroneous about Winterbottom, and correct 
about MacPherson, is not captured by the thought that we once lived in a world that only 
recognized duties of care within contractual and other pre-existing relationships, and now 
live in a world where duties run to strangers. 
 Equally mistaken is the supposition that, in order to reject Winterbottom, MacPherson 
was required to adopt the idea that tort duties are owed to the world at large. One could 
instead take the view—and in fact Cardozo did take the view—that tort duties are owed to 
all persons within a broad class of persons. A product manufacturer, he reasoned, owes a 
duty of care to members of the class of persons, some of whom probably will be injured by 
the product if it is made carelessly and put to ordinary use without further tests or 
inspections. This class obviously includes persons with no personal connection to the 
manufacturer. Suppose that, because of Buick’s carelessness, one of its cars crashed while 
being used in an ordinary manner, resulting in injury to a passenger. The passenger would 
stand to recover from Buick for negligence. The fact that Buick and the passenger had no 
previous interactions would be irrelevant.   
 Under MacPherson, the class of persons to whom manufacturers owe a duty of care is 
a large and indeterminate group whose members cannot be identified in advance. One might 
therefore be tempted to give a shorthand description of this duty as owed to the public at 
large. But this shorthand sows confusion, for it quickly slides into the view that the duty of 
care in negligence really isn’t owed to anyone in particular, but rather is a “simple” or generic 
duty. As we have pointed out elsewhere, this slide has caused a great deal of mischief in 
modern thinking about negligence law. For now it is enough to note that it is a slide that 
Cardozo himself avoided.  We know this not only from MacPherson itself but from Palsgraf as 
well. Indeed, the misattribution of a nonrelational view of duty to MacPherson has played a 
large part in rendering Palsgraf unintelligible to modern torts scholars.23  
 It is also important to emphasize that a view of duty such as Cardozo’s can 
simultaneously insist that the duty of care in negligence is relational—always owed to the 
members of a particular class of potential injury victims—while also insisting that duty in 
negligence is relationship-sensitive, in that the presence or absence of certain kind of pre-tort 
relationships between injurer and victim might determine the scope of the duty owed and, in 
certain circumstances, its existence.  Doctors owe duties of care to their patients that others 
do not. So too do businesses with respect to customers on their premises. This is hardly 
surprising, though again it is a feature of negligence law that modern commentators gloss 
over. Part of the value of recognizing that tort duties are analytically relational—owed to 
certain others—is that it allows one easily to grasp why relationships matter to the content of 
the duties actually owed to others. On a duty-to-the-world conception, by contrast, it is 
                                                      
22 J.H. BAKER,  AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 409 & n. 40 (4th ed. 2002). 
23 See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note ††, at 1817-21. 
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something of a mystery why duties of care should be sensitive to the presence or absence of 
a special relationship.  
 Finally, as we emphasized many years ago in The Moral of MacPherson, there is indeed 
a sense in which Cardozo accepts that duties of care in negligence law are universal, but 
there are two ways this can be understood.24 The duty not to batter or defraud another 
person is universal. Whether one owes this sort of duty to another does not turn on any 
prior relationship, but on aspects of human well being that one is obligated not to interfere 
with in certain ways. Likewise, the duty to take care not to injure another person by placing a 
dangerous product on the market in circumstances where it would imperil their life or limb, 
does not require an identified right-bearer, but applies to various persons who foreseeably 
stand to be injured by carelessness. It is a mistake, however, to suppose that the unlimited 
range of persons to whom a duty is owed means that there are no beneficiaries of the duty, 
or that the beneficiary is rightly identified as the state or the public. More modestly, even 
those who join Prosser and others in adopting the duty-to-the-public conception of 
universality have no basis for attributing that view to Cardozo in Macpherson or anywhere 
else. 
  
 B.  Pragmatic Conceptualism in Adjudication  
 One of the interpretive challenges faced by standard accounts is that MacPherson in 
most respects reads like a traditional judicial opinion. Cardozo is concerned to answer the 
doctrinal question of whether Buick owed a duty of care to a person such as MacPherson. 
And he answers that question overwhelmingly by means of a careful parsing of precedents, 
with occasional asides on the immediate practical implications of its analysis. In other words, 
his opinion seems actually to be concerned to answer the question of whether, under 
prevailing law, Buick committed negligence against MacPherson. 
 The suggestion that disguised policy reasoning is the ‘real’ engine of MacPherson is 
driven in part by the thought (which we reject) that, while Cardozo’s doctrinal analysis is 
presented as a faithful application of precedent, in fact it stretches precedent to reach the 
progressive result he sought. For example, in his MacPherson dissent, Chief Judge Bartlett in 
effect accused Cardozo of playing fast and loose with the idea of a “thing of danger” by 
treating automobiles to be no less “imminently dangerous to life” than “poisons, explosives, 
deadly weapons—things whose normal function it is to injure or destroy.”25 Cardozo, he 
claimed, had taken a narrow exception to the privity rule first recognized for mislabeled 
poisons in Thomas v. Winchester and, without saying so, converted it into the opposite rule that 
privity is not required.   
 To take this view of MacPherson is, however, simply to fall for Buick Motor 
Company’s highly tendentious treatment of New York precedents—a treatment that, 
                                                      
24 Id. at 1821-24. 
25 MacPherson v. Buick, 111 N.E. 1050, 1052 (N.Y. 1916); id. at 1056 (Bartlett, C.J., dissenting) 
(arguing that, under New York precedents, the privity rule admitted only of limited exceptions for 
especially dangerous products).  
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notably, only Bartlett accepted.26 Thomas v. Winchester, which was decided more than a half 
century prior to MacPherson, did not rest on the idea that a special rule was needed only for 
those products whose point is to cause harm (and, indeed, the product in that case was 
intended as a medication, and only harmful because it had been mislabeled). Although a 
subsequent Court of Appeals decision—Loop v. Litchfield27—had entertained this 
characterization of Thomas, the Court had abandoned it well before the time of MacPherson.     
True, the litigants in MacPherson appear to have teed up two different interpretations 
of when New York negligence law would permit product manufacturers to be sued by 
persons not in privity with the manufacturer. On Buick’s view, the product needed to belong 
to the dangerous-by-its-very-nature category.  On MacPherson’s, if the product was of a type 
such that it was dangerous-when-negligently-made—in the sense of ‘an accident waiting to 
happen’—a duty of care was owed to a user who could be expected to face that danger. Yet 
the cases were hardly in equipoise as between these two interpretations. As Andrew 
Kaufman put it: “The New York Court of Appeals was already close to the MacPherson 
result, and Cardozo was most ready to innovate when the distance he had to travel from 
established law was small.”28 Already in Devlin v. Smith, decided in 1882, the New York Court 
of Appeals had rejected Buick’s reading of the cases. Devlin had allowed a claim by injured 
workers against the manufacturer of a defective scaffold, notwithstanding the absence of 
privity. In so holding, it characterized New York law as holding that third parties can recover 
when “the defect is such as to render the article in itself imminently dangerous, and serious 
injury to any person using it, is a natural and probable consequence of its use.”29 In other 
words, the Court of Appeals had already stated more than three decades before MacPherson 
that the relevant focus is on the dangerousness of the product when carelessly made, not the 
dangerousness of the product when made with care.  
To make matters worse for Buick, in the decade immediately prior to MacPherson, the 
Court of Appeals had decided only two negligence cases involving plaintiffs not in privity 
                                                      
26 This is perhaps a slight overstatement. Two of three judges on a Second Circuit panel had 
credited a similar privity argument a year earlier. Cadillac Motor Car Co. v. Johnson, 221 F. 801 (2nd 
Cir. 1915). Of course, under another 1842 decision—Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842)—the Second 
Circuit in Johnson was not strictly bound by New York precedents, though it purported to follow 
them. Johnson’s adoption of this aggressively defendant-friendly interpretation is indicative of the sort 
of reasoning that contributed to the downfall of the general common law in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 
304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
27 42 N.Y. 351 (1870). 
28 ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 275 (1998). Kaufman adds that Cardozo relied on 
“[a]nalogy, powered by public policy considerations” to “reformulate and improve the governing 
doctrine.” Id. Kaufman’s reference to “public policy” quite clearly is not meant to suggest that 
MacPherson is best understood as an exercise in forward-looking, instrumental reasoning, as opposed 
to an exercise in the interpretation of precedent. Indeed, Kaufman rightly emphasizes the absence of 
instrumentalist analysis in Cardozo’s opinion. Id. at 272-73.  As we understand it, his reference to 
“public policy” aims to capture the fact that Cardozo, like all good judges, deemed certain fairly 
obvious practical considerations to be relevant to the interpretation of precedent. See infra text 
accompanying notes 38 - 41. 
29 Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470, 477 (1882) (emphasis added). 
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with the manufacturer: Statler and Torgenson. As noted above, Statler involved a coffee urn and 
Torgenson involved a bottle of seltzer water, and in both cases the absence of privity was 
deemed no bar to recovery. Neither a coffee urn nor a bottle of carbonated water has harm 
to humans as its raison-d’etre, and neither posed a baseline risk of injury so high as to warrant 
placing them in a separate category of extraordinarily dangerous products. And so Cardozo 
was hardly engaging in legerdemain when he rejected the narrow reading of Thomas once 
entertained by the Court in Loop and advocated in MacPherson by Buick:  “whatever the rule 
in Thomas v. Winchester may once have been, it has no longer that restricted meaning.”30 
Cardozo’s MacPherson opinion is thus easily and rightly taken at face value. It says, 
with powerful precedential support, that New York common law is most cogently 
interpreted as requiring the manufacturer of a product to exercise due care towards persons 
beyond those in privity, if it is the kind of product that would seriously endanger life and 
limb if defective. Once this framework is recognized, one quite easily reaches the conclusion 
that car manufacturers owe a duty of care to those who would use the car without inspection 
and who could be expected to be injured if the car were carelessly made. By contrast, any 
effort to read it as a legislative decision that rests on instrumentalist policy analysis will 
inevitably be strained. Indeed, such a reading is so implausible that its most prominent 
advocates—Leon Green, Grant Gilmore, and Richard Posner—were forced to take 
desperate measures to salvage it. MacPherson doesn’t read like a policy decision, they say, only 
because Cardozo realized that, if he were forthright about his policy-oriented approach, he 
would scare off his audience (the hidebound bench and bar). In Gilmore’s phrase, Cardozo 
“went to extraordinary lengths to hide his light under a bushel.”31  
 In the manner of all good conspiracy theories, the Green-Gilmore-Posner reading is 
resistant to outright falsification. It is nonetheless readily shown to be feeble. Nothing in 
Cardozo’s voluminous writings—his opinions, his extra-judicial writings, his 
correspondence—suggest that he was engaged in this sort of misdirection in this or any 
other opinion. To the contrary, they suggest that what he wrote is what he meant. Likewise, 
there is no evidence that Cardozo was trained in, or comfortable with, the sort of policy 
analysis that is said to be the secret engine of his decision. Again, if anything, there is 
evidence to the contrary.32     
 Gilmore, Posner and others have felt compelled to offer implausible interpretations 
of MacPherson because they supposed (correctly) that Cardozo was a great judge, and further 
supposed (incorrectly) that one cannot be a great judge without being an instrumentalist 
about adjudication. The latter supposition is but one expression of the familiar, though 
deeply confused, thought that, since law is a human creation that serves human purposes, it 
can only be applied and analyzed instrumentally. It should go without saying that practices 
and institutions created by humans often serve human purposes indirectly.  
 For example, professional baseball provides, among other things, entertainment, as 
well as fostering a form of loyalty that many fans find rewarding. It hardly follows that the 
                                                      
30 MacPherson v. Buick, 111 N.E. 1050, 1052 (N.Y. 1916). 
31 See Grant Gilmore, The Storrs Lectures: The Age of Anxiety, 84 YALE L.J. 1022, 1031 (1975); see 
also POSNER, supra note 11, at 109; Green, supra note 11, at 9. 
32 John C. P. Goldberg, Book Review: The Life of the Law, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1419, 1440-41 (1999). 
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home-plate umpire employed for a particular game should call balls and strikes based on 
whether each call, or the run of calls, will make the particular game in question entertaining, 
or will promote fan loyalty. Our point is not to suggest, as Chief Justice Roberts famously 
once did, that the task of a Supreme Court justice closely resembles that of a home-plate 
umpire calling balls and strikes.33 It is rather to support the simple and obvious (yet oft-
ignored) point that practices and institutions often serve ends indirectly, through the 
observance and application of their rules, rather than through acts and decisions that are 
relentlessly instrumental. 
 In his insightful symposium contribution, Professor Witt generously credits us for 
capturing the way in which Cardozo approached legal issues from a perspective “internal” to 
the common law.34 At the same time, he suggests that Cardozo’s conception of common law 
judging (and ours) is seriously incomplete, both intellectually and institutionally. Legal rules, 
Witt observes, must sooner or later account for themselves not by reference to what has 
been decided in the past, but on what they stand to accomplish. Similarly, common law 
courts must justify their role as but one among the many organs of modern government. 
While Witt claims that Cardozo acknowledged these truths, he also worries that Cardozo 
never explained (nor have we in our work) how to reconcile a commitment to precedent-
based reasoning with law’s being a purposive institution, and never explained the place of 
the common law courts in the regulatory state. Witt suggestively concludes that there may be 
a Burkean story to tell here: that the common law’s backward-looking orientation and its 
insistence on principle might serve as a helpful counterweight to the forward-looking, 
rationalistic methods of the regulatory agencies that today are the face of government.35  
 Our view and, we think Cardozo’s, is that Witt’s framing of the contrast between 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ perspectives, and between common law and regulatory law, is too 
stark. Among the modern state’s, and modern law’s, purposes is the articulation of norms of 
interpersonal conduct, and the determination of the duties we owe and the rights that we 
have against one another. This is a task that judges have always undertaken and, by and large, 
are well equipped by their legal training and experience to undertake. And it is one that 
plainly connects to values that matter, including the value of encouraging responsible 
behavior and of holding people and firms accountable for mistreating others.  
 Common-law adjudication, meanwhile, can be and is both precedent-based and 
pragmatic. Indeed, Cardozo’s genius resided precisely in his ability to combine these 
dimensions of judicial decision-making, and to do so seamlessly. MacPherson, as admirers 
have long observed, is anything but a formalistic decision, but it is also not an exercise in 
                                                      
33 Statement of John Roberts, Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings on the Nomination of John 
Roberts to Be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (Sept. 12, 2005) (“I have no agenda, but I do have 
a commitment. If I am confirmed, I will confront every case with an open mind. I will fully and 
fairly analyze the legal arguments that are presented. I will be open to the considered views of my 
colleagues on the bench. And I will decide every case based on the record, according to the rule of 
law, without fear or favor, to the best of my ability. And I will remember that it’s my job to call balls 
and strikes and not to pitch or bat.”) 
34 John Fabian Witt, Ives and MacPherson: Judicial Process in the Regulatory State, J. TORT LAW __, 
__ (2016). 
35 Id. at __. 
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discretionary policymaking. It represents instead Cardozo’s gift for synthesizing, refining, 
revising and pushing forward ideas immanent in the law.36 
In a lecture published eight years after Macpherson was decided, Cardozo described the 
state of the law prior to the decision as follows: 
 
A mass of judgments, more or less relevant, had been rendered by the same and other 
courts. A body of particulars existed on which an hypothesis might be reared. None 
the less, their implications were equivocal.  We see this in the fact that the judgment 
of the court was not rendered without dissent. Whether the law can be said to have 
existed in advance of the decision, will depend upon the varying estimates of the 
nexus between the conclusion and the existing principle and precedent.37 
  
If a “formalist” judge is one who supposes that common law adjudication involves a judge 
divining an uncontestably correct rule from prior decisions, Cardozo clearly was not a 
formalist. He concedes, after all, that there were different ways of understanding the “thing 
of danger” category. In turn, it might seem plausible to assert that Cardozo understood 
adjudication, at least in hard cases, to consist of an exercise in discretionary lawmaking, akin 
to legislation. 
  As many before us have pointed out, this last inference goes too far. It is one thing to 
concede, as practically everyone does, that, in hard cases, more than one rule can be 
fashioned. It is quite another to suppose that adjudication in such cases amounts to anything 
resembling de novo lawmaking on the model of legislation. Cardozo’s use of the term 
“hypothesis” is quite helpful in capturing the space between these two ideas. First, it suggests 
                                                      
36 In relation to the question of common law adjudication, Witt suggests that our ‘umpiring’ 
analogy (mentioned in the text above), while helpful to a point, is incomplete or misleading because 
it applies only to run-of-the mill judicial decisions, not decisions at the edges of precedent. A more 
apt baseball analogy for a case such as MacPherson, he suggests, might be the infamous “pine-tar” 
incident. Id. at __.  
In a 1983 game between the Kansas City Royals and the New York Yankees, home plate umpire 
Tim McClelland disallowed a dramatic, ninth inning home-run hit by Royals star George Brett after 
Billy Martin, the Yankees manager, pointed out that there was pine tar – a sticky substance that 
helps batters grip their bats – more than 18 inches up from the handle of Brett’s bat, in violation of 
league rules. Upon the filing of a protest by the Royals, American League President Lee MacPhail 
reversed McClelland’s decision, reasoning (as he apparently had once before, ten years earlier) that 
the proper remedy for Brett’s violation was seizure of the offending bat, not disallowance of the 
home run. The rule, he reasoned, was not a rule of fair competition but instead an economizing 
measure designed to reduce the number of baseballs that would need to be replaced during a game 
because smudged with pine-tar. Neither McClelland (who, of course, was required to make a more-
or-less instantaneous ruling) nor MacPhail (who, with the benefit of the time for reflection accorded 
to judges offered a very lawyerly interpretation of the relevant rule) engaged in instrumental 
reasoning. Raymond Belliotti, Billy Martin and Jurisprudence: Revisiting the Pine Tar Case, 5 ALBANY 
GOV’T L. REV. 210, 217, 228-29 (2012). (MacPhail would also have been justified in reversing on the 
ground that the complainant – the insufferable Martin – opportunistically waited to complain about 
the bat until a moment in which it would matter, and thus lacked clean hands. Id. at 212-13.) 
37 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 40-41 (1924). 
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that the immediate task at hand, even in hard cases, is that of inducing from prior decisions a 
rule or principle that will resolve the dispute before the court. Often, Cardozo suggested, the 
judge will be aided in this task by paying careful attention to the historical context in which 
prior decisions were made, as well as prevailing social practices (if any) among those whose 
conduct will most immediately be affected by the court’s decision, and prevailing social 
norms. These legal, historical and sociological inquiries, he emphasized, are all in aid of 
making the best sense one can of the ‘direction’ in which the law is moving.   
 For Cardozo, it surely mattered that Winterbottom had been decided in 1842, and that, 
in the seventy five years leading up to MacPherson, a growing corpus of New York and 
English decisions had declined to apply the privity rule. It also mattered to Cardozo that 
prevailing political sentiments were arguably moving away from rugged individualism to less 
stringently individualistic forms of liberalism.   
 Whatever one may think of this sort of exercise, it bears little resemblance to the idea 
of a judge legislating based on his or her view of the consequences that will follow from 
adopting the rule. To be sure, Cardozo allowed that practical considerations could figure in 
the judicial resolution of a hard case. In particular, he accepted that the prospect of highly 
undesirable practical consequences was a ground for rejecting a rule that could otherwise 
claim validity in terms of its fit with precedent and practice. This was the upshot of an oft-
quoted passage from another decision for which Cardozo wrote the opinion—Ultramares 
Corp. v. Touche.38 Ultramares held that accountants should not be held liable to all persons who 
foreseeably might suffer economic loss as a result of their malpractice. Contrasting the scope 
of liability for fraud, Cardozo reasoned as follows: 
  
A different question develops when we ask whether [the defendant accountants] 
owed a duty to [all creditors and investors of the audited firm] to make [the audit] 
without negligence. If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the 
failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose 
accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an 
indeterminate class. The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so 
extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a 
duty that exposes [it] to these consequences.39  
  
The point here is not that duty questions boil down to, or are constituted by, instrumental 
questions. Cardozo is not making a theoretical claim about the meaning of duty. Rather he is 
making a pragmatic point about judicial decision-making: the probable consequences of 
different duty rules are among the considerations that bear on the question of whether to 
recognize and how to define the duty owed by a certain kind of actor to certain classes of 
potential victim.     
 A similar approach to reasoning about duty, though it pointed toward a different 
result, is on display in MacPherson itself. Whatever plausibility Winterbottom may have once 
                                                      
38 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931). 
39 Id. at 444. 
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had, Cardozo’s opinion asserted, it made little practical sense in an era in which car 
manufacturers had adopted the dealership model of distribution:   
 
The dealer was indeed the one person of whom it might be said with some approach 
to certainty that by him the car would not be used. Yet the defendant would have us 
say that he was the one person whom it was under a legal duty to protect. The law 
does not lead us to so inconsequent a conclusion. Precedents drawn from the days of 
travel by stage coach do not fit the conditions of travel to-day. The principle that the 
danger must be imminent does not change, but the things subject to the principle do 
change. They are whatever the needs of life in a developing civilization require them 
to be.40 
 
In other words, there would be something odd about inducing from New York precedents a 
rule of duty for product manufacturers according to which the only persons owed care are 
those who will interact with the products in a manner that will rarely, if ever, generate 
injuries, even as there are many others, to whom no duty is owed, who can be expected to 
interact with the same products in ways that will cause injuries. If manufacturers are to be 
subject to the law of negligence with respect to injuries caused by their products, they surely 
must be held to owe duties to at least some of the persons whom they predictably will injure 
through their carelessness. This is exactly the principle that runs through the pre-MacPherson 
case law: insofar as a product that will be sent out into the world without being further 
inspected for safety is a product that poses a probable danger to certain classes of persons, 
the manufacturer’s duty is owed to those persons.  
 In rejecting the view that Cardozo was being an activist judge and in rejecting the 
instrumentalist account of his opinion, we are not denying that both moral and practical 
considerations figured in his decision. To the contrary. The point is that the question of 
whether Buick had a duty of care to product users like MacPherson is not shorthand for 
whether there should be liability. Rather it is, to a very significant extent, what it appears to 
be—namely, the practically and morally informed extraction of a principle from precedent.41 
Judges who are charged with overseeing how tort suits will proceed are being asked whether 
the law makes it incumbent upon a car manufacturer to be vigilant of the life and limb of car 
users. Focusing on what would be relevant to answering the moral question—what sorts of 
interests are being risked, how much reliance there is, how well situated users are to protect 
themselves—Cardozo of course answered that there is such a duty. To put the point 
somewhat more sensitively, Cardozo decided that, given this constellation of circumstances, 
                                                      
40 MacPherson v. Buick , 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916). 
41 We would not go so far as to suggest, in the manner of Dworkin, that Cardozo adopted the 
interpretation of New York precedents that rendered them the ‘best they can be’ from the 
perspective of morality. It was enough, in Cardozo’s view, to adopt an interpretation of the law that 
rendered it morally plausible. Relatedly, unlike Dworkin’s Hercules, we do not regard MacPherson to 
be best interpreted as stating the rule that all foreseeable victims of all kinds of carelessly caused 
harm are owed a duty of care. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 238-50 (1986) (suggesting that the 
reading of MacPherson and other precedents that renders them morally most attractive is one that 
would recognize a general duty to take care against causing others to suffer emotional distress).  
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the absence of a contractual relationship did not suffice to establish that there was no legal 
duty of care owed to product users. 
  
 C.  Negligence as a Wrong  
 Insofar as MacPherson is taken to herald the arrival of a nonwrongs-based, purely 
instrumental conception of strict products liability, it has been badly miscast. To see this, one 
only need to contrast Cardozo’s language to that of Traynor in Greenman42 (quoted above): 
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place and limb in peril 
when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Its nature gives warning of the 
consequences to be expected. If to the element of danger there is added knowledge 
that the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new 
tests then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a 
duty to make it carefully. That is as far as we are required to go for the decision of 
this case. . . .  There is here no break in the chain of cause and effect. In such 
circumstances, the presence of a known danger, attendant upon a known use, makes 
vigilance a duty. We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and 
limb, when the consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract 
and nothing else. We have put the source of the obligation where it ought to be. We 
have put its source in the law.43 
 
Quite evidently, Cardozo’s line of attack on the privity rule come from within a moralized 
understanding of negligence as a legal wrong. The principle he puts forward is not about 
where costs are best placed to provide compensation or achieve deterrence, but about who is 
really responsible for an injury.   
 Nor was MacPherson an outlier within Cardozo’s judicial corpus. In fact, he quite 
consistently displayed reluctance to shift from negligence to strict liability, even when facing 
a claim by a vulnerable individual against a corporate defendant that was well situated to bear 
the cost. In Adams v. Bullock, for example, Cardozo ruled that a trolley company could not be 
held liable in negligence to a boy who was electrocuted when a long piece of wire that the 
boy was dangling over the edge of a bridge made contact with the company’s uninsulated 
wires.44 Liability could not be imposed, he concluded, because there was nothing about the 
particular location of this incident that should have alerted the company to a heightened risk 
of injury and hence a need to take particular precautionary measures there. Moreover, the 
taking of systemic measures to avert such injuries would have demanded of the trolley 
company something well beyond reasonable care: namely, the abandonment of the 
enterprise in anything like the form in which it had operated. To hold the trolley company 
liable on these terms would have been to treat it as an “insurer” of electrocution victims.45 
Negligence is negligence, Adams insists. It is not strict liability. 
                                                      
42 See supra text accompanying note 17. 
43 MacPherson, 111 N.E., at 1053. 
44 125 N.E. 93 (N.Y. 1919). 
45 Id. at 94. 
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 In light of Adams and other decisions, it is implausible to read MacPherson as somehow 
downplaying the connections between negligence liability and ordinary notions of 
wrongdoing and responsibility. So far as Cardozo was concerned, when a court sets about 
determining whether a defendant should be held liable to a plaintiff for negligence, it aims to 
determine whether, under existing doctrine or a fair extension of it, the defendant can be 
held responsible to the plaintiff for having carelessly injured the plaintiff. And this 
determination requires judgments as to the wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct. 
 Our point is not that Cardozo was inalterably opposed to all forms of ‘strict’ liability.  
There are genuine legal wrongs that involve the violation of strict standards of conduct —
most notably in contract law but also in certain applications of tort law—and Cardozo was 
clearly open to recognizing at least some of these.46 For example, in Ryan v. Progressive Stores, a 
grocery store that sold a loaf of bread with a pin inside of it was held liable to the plaintiff, 
whose mouth was injured when he bit into the bread.47 Cardozo was willing to impose 
warranty-based liability on the retailer notwithstanding that the bread was baked by someone 
else and was sold in a sealed container: the failure of the product to meet the quality 
standards that the retailer had implicitly warranted was sufficient. In short, Cardozo regarded 
it as a wrong, in and of itself, for a seller to injure a consumer by selling the consumer a 
dangerously substandard product, irrespective of the degree of care exercised by the seller. It 
is clear, however, that Cardozo regarded the wrong in Ryan as a contractual wrong—a breach 
of an implicit term of the agreement between retailer and consumer—rather than a tort 
wrong.    
Whether Cardozo would have been willing to recognize strict, warranty-like liability in 
tort rather than contract, and thus treat causation of injury through the sale of a dangerously 
defective product as a wrong irrespective of any promise of quality, is an open question. 
However, even if he would have, the idea of treating injury through the sale of a defective 
product as a wrong is quite distinct from the idea of strict products liability as an instrument 
for the achievement of compensation and deterrence. And it is the latter idea that is at the 
heart of Escola and Greenman. In stark contrast to Cardozo’s antipathy to insurance rationales 
within the domain of legal wrongs, these authorities favored a fusion of warranty and tort 
precisely so that liability could be used to spread the cost of injuries, to spare plaintiffs the 
challenge of proving wrongdoing, and to improve deterrence. None of these rationales 
figured in MacPherson. To the contrary, Cardozo clearly thought about Buick’s responsibility 
in the more traditional, duty- and wrong-based terms of the common law of torts. 
 
III.  ONE HUNDRED YEARS ON: THE COSTS OF  
MISUNDERSTANDING MACPHERSON  
  
 The long tradition of misreading MacPherson is, alas, not merely an academic matter.  
It has instead helped to fuel a series of problematic developments in law and legal theory.  
Here we briefly sketch some of those problems. 
                                                      
46 John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Strict Liability in Fault and the Fault in Strict 
Liability, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. ___ (2016) (forthcoming). 
47 175 N.E. 105 (N.Y. 1931). 
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 A. Taking Responsibility Seriously 
The non-relational conception of duty looks progressive because it seems to sit well 
with the following sentiment. Never mind the issue of whether manufacturers ought to conceive of 
consumers as persons to whom care is owed: that issue, if it is even cogent, simply obscures the real question, 
which is whether a person hurt by a product should be able to recover, absent privity. Responsibility to 
consumers is aspirational and moralistic; liability is real. 
On our view, it is a huge mistake to put aside the question of to whom vigilance and 
care is owed and to focus exclusively on liability-as-threat. The law needs more tools in its 
tool kit. Large businesses are costly to sue, are often well-positioned to stonewall, and can 
frequently defeat even plausible claims. It surely is important that consumers have the power 
to sue manufacturers, to recover damages from them, and to negotiate for compensation 
against a background where there is an enforceable legal right. But Cardozo was onto 
something even more important.   
Companies that make products may be artificial entities, but they still have 
responsibilities. It is critical that those who work for manufacturers maintain a self-
conception as actors who take consumers’ safety to be important. We as a society want the 
social safety norms that govern interpersonal interactions to govern business conduct, too. 
The increasing dependence on ‘liability rules’ for social control of corporate conduct is often 
inefficient and ineffectual. Large companies and those who control them need to operate in 
a way that mimics the actions of natural persons—they need to understand themselves as 
obligated to be vigilant of risks to their consumers and to act accordingly. 
Our point is far less precious than it might seem. Twentieth Century corporate law in 
fact made a psychological turn of the sort we are advocating, albeit in a different context. It 
is now standard fare for judicial decisions, and for law school and business school courses, 
to emphasize that corporate directors and managers must take very seriously the fiduciary 
duties they owe to shareholders.48 The point, it seems, is to guide directors’ conduct—to 
force them to frame decisions (in tender offer cases, for example) in a way that puts 
shareholders’ financial interests ahead of the interests of current management, employees, or 
local communities. Corporate law is telling these actors how they are supposed to think 
about their responsibilities and it is using the language of duty to do so. For better or worse, 
this message seems to have affected how these actors actually think about their 
responsibilities.49 
The example of legal duties to shareholders has two important implications for our 
analysis. First, it provides a concrete example of how a way of understanding duties, even in 
the ‘bottom-line’ oriented domain of business, might actually translate into an adjustment in 
                                                      
48 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 
NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003) (arguing that corporate directors bear ultimate decision-making authority 
within a corporation, but that this authority is subject to a fiduciary duty, contractual in origin, that 
requires them to make decisions that maximize shareholder wealth, and that precludes them from 
pursuing conflicting objectives). 
49 Id. at 575-76 (asserting that directors probably tend to “adhere to the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm”). 
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norms and conduct, and does by means other than a mere threat of liability divorced from a 
notion of wrongdoing. The second point goes in a different direction. The importance, 
today, of having publicly held companies be vigilant of consumers’ physical well being is 
especially great precisely because of the increased focus on shareholders. The duty to 
maximize shareholder well-being must be pursued within the limits of the law (at least in 
principle). But if tort law is understood in terms of liability rules, rather than actual 
mandatory duties of conduct, then we have set things up so that risking tort liability in the 
corporate decision-making context may actually seem, from the internal point of view of the 
corporate actor, to be the legally correct choice. 
 One need not join Occupy Wall Street to see a serious problem with the current state 
of thinking on corporate responsibilities. Were one to look at publicly held pharmaceutical 
companies, for example, one might well find a striking contrast between managerial attitudes 
toward contract and tort. Managers probably view their legally imposed fiduciary duties to 
shareholders as having obligatory force. At the same time, they probably tend to view tort as 
merely a collection of liability rules: the cost they will incur if consumers are hurt by defects 
in their products, if those consumers sue, and if the cases cannot be fended off. The irony is 
thick. 175 years after Winterbottom, contract—in the form of duties to shareholders—is back 
on top, even in the Thomas v. Winchester domain of dangerous drugs. Tort duties, meanwhile, 
are given less then full credence. Read rightly, Cardozo’s MacPherson opinion points in a very 
different direction.   
 
 B. Instrumentalism and Tort Reform 
 No doubt there is something temperamental or personal about our preference for 
pragmatic conceptualism over reductive instrumentalism—for Cardozo over Holmes, and, 
yes, for Dworkin over Posner. But it is entirely wrong to suppose that, by rejecting 
instrumentalism, we are favoring a politically conservative agenda over a politically 
progressive one. True, in the middle of the twentieth century, it was usually progressives 
who advocated an instrumentalist approach to tort law. But our whole point is that there 
was, back then, and is now, a different, and better way to get to a more progressive tort law, 
and it is the one found in MacPherson. A huge part of our anti-instrumentalist agenda has 
been rooted in the idea that instrumentalism in tort law has become a battering ram for a 
well-funded and vigorous tort reform movement, both in courts and in legislatures. 
 As to the courts, Prosser’s avowedly reductive analysis of duty at first did serve as a 
progressive mantra, particularly for the California Supreme Court in decisions such as 
Rowland, Dillon, and Tarasoff.50  But for the last 35 years, judges and justices who came of age 
in the tort reform era see Prosser’s famous “shorthand for policy” quip in a wholly different 
way.  Ensuring compensation and deterrence are no longer major policy objectives, or at 
least are not thought to be best implemented through tort law. When it comes to torts, 
courts worry incessantly about floodgates and frivolous litigation, rising costs of products 
and services due to liability insurance, and the distorting effects of tort liability on 
                                                      
50 John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Shielding Duty: How Attending to Assumption of 
Risk, Attractive Nuisance, and Other “Quaint” Doctrines Can Improve Decisionmaking in Negligence Cases, 79 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 329, 329-30 (2006) (reviewing these and other California decisions). 
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spontaneous activities of ordinary people. We are not saying these concerns do not matter. 
Sometimes they do. We are merely observing, from the vantage point of 2016, how 
shortsighted and unrealistic it is to suppose that, if courts are told that “duty” is simply a 
blunderbuss policy decision, they will move the law in a progressive direction. 
 As we are (appropriately) celebrating MacPherson at a meeting in New York, it is fitting 
to mention a recent Second Circuit decision, Munn v. The Hotchkiss School.51 The plaintiff, 
Cara Munn, a 15 year-old student, was bitten by a tick in the forests of Northeast China 
while on a hike organized by her prep school. The tick carried encephalitis, and the plaintiff 
consequently suffered permanent and serious brain damage. Hotchkiss Academy, the 
defendant, had failed to warn students of the risk of serious insect-borne illnesses in this 
region. Moreover, it had not directed or encouraged the students to wear long clothing or 
insect repellant; and it allowed her and her friends to take an especially dense and buggy path 
from the top of the mountain they had climbed. In the District Court in Connecticut, a jury 
awarded the plaintiff $10 million in economic damages and $31.5 in non-economic 
damages. Hotchkiss argued on appeal that students and society would suffer if schools were 
forced to discontinue field trips because of fear of liability, and hence the Second Circuit 
should rule that the school owed its students no duty of care. While the Second Circuit did 
not accept this argument, it did not reject it either, instead certifying the duty issue to the 
Connecticut Supreme Court, along with the issue of whether the damages were excessive 
under Connecticut law.    
 We see the policy argument of course, and we see a potential basis for supposing that 
the Second Circuit should order a new trial on damages. Perhaps a careful review of the 
record might even suggest the propriety of entering judgment as a matter of law for the 
defendant on the issue of breach or causation. But there is no serious argument that 
Hotchkiss should prevail on its no-duty argument. As a matter of Connecticut law, and the 
law of other states, it would be absurd to suggest that a school owes no duty of care to its 
minor students. Yet Hotchkiss’s lawyers, seizing on the Prosserian language of prior 
Connecticut Supreme Court decisions, are understandably trying to use the modern “no 
duty” rubric to enact a bit of tort reform.  Over and over again, these sorts of defense 
gambits have worked. We hope they do not in Munn.    
 Our point on tort reform and instrumentalism concerns not only courts but also 
legislatures.  Indeed, since the heyday of progressive instrumentalism in the 1960s and 70s, 
the most substantial changes in tort law have been made in the statehouse, not the 
courtroom. This is no coincidence. Our understanding of tort law as rooted in principled 
common law reasoning made courts the obvious place for change and development. By 
contrast, if tort law—at an appellate level—is really just judicial policymaking, then there is 
no reason to presume it belongs in the domain of the judiciary. Legislatures, it is supposed, 
are better at getting the big picture of policy implications. Even if not, they enjoy democratic 
authority that judges often lack. The conception of tort law as rooted in instrumentalist 
reasoning has quite naturally led to a devolution of control from courts to legislatures. This 
is not to deny that legislatures have always been entitled to exercise such power, nor that 
they sometimes did exercise that power. But today, in dozens and dozens of states, the 
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institutional understanding has shifted on who will be making the law about who can sue 
whom for what and how much they will receive if they win. Needless to say, we think the 
partial shift of de facto tort lawmaking to legislatures has been something of a disaster.    
 
 C. Mistaking Regulation for Redress, and Redress for Regulation 
We have argued that scholars have overstated the continuity between MacPherson and 
strict products liability. This, too, is a mistake of some moment, but it is admittedly more 
difficult to see why. 
Preliminarily, we recognize that progressives have sometimes benefited by depicting 
strict products liability as simply an extension of negligence. Even today, a substantial 
domain of strict products liability law remains in place, notwithstanding the efforts of 
businesses and some academics to discredit it. Contemporary efforts to cast strict products 
liability as based on risk-utility analysis, and hence largely continuous with negligence, have 
amounted to a rewriting of legal history.  Arguably, however, the rewrite was well-motivated 
and somewhat successful in warding off more aggressive tort reform. We shall leave this 
point to one side, for the moment, and depict the other side: the regressive consequences of 
overstating the continuity between MacPherson and strict products liability. 
First, the mythical supposition that there is no real gap between MacPherson’s 
application of negligence law and Greenman’s recognition of strict products liability, though 
originally offered by Traynor and others to justify the emergence of the latter doctrine, is 
today being harnessed in the opposite direction, to pull products liability back toward 
negligence. In particular, the Products Liability portion of the Third Torts Restatement puts 
forward several provisions that articulate a view of products liability as really just a form of 
negligence, and several of those provisions tend to be much more helpful to defendants than 
current doctrine in many states. Requiring design defect plaintiffs to prove that the product 
fails the risk-utility test, rather than the consumer expectation test, is a clear example.52 
Another move benefitting defendants was the expansion of the notion that state-of-the-art 
sets a limit on product defectiveness, and the related abandonment of hindsight-based 
standards of defectiveness.53 The decision to have comparative fault apply to products 
liability law—recognized in, though not led by, the Restatement—was also a move in the 
direction of negligence law.54 
Second, numerous jurisdictions now seem to view central features of strict products 
liability as anomalous and unfair—bridling at what strikes them as ‘naked’ redistribution— 
and have therefore changed them via legislative reform. Most notably, several states have 
enacted “closed container” laws that eliminate the possibility of strict liability for retailers 
who sell defective products that are sent by the manufacturer in sealed packaging.55 These 
reforms rest in part on the intuition that tort law is simply too inattentive to ordinary notions 
                                                      
52 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) & cmt. g (1998). 
53 Id. at § 2(b) & cmt. f 
54 Id. at § 17; id. at Reporters’ Note to cmt. a (reviewing a split among courts on whether to 
recognize comparative fault as a defense to products liability claims). 
55 1 MARSHALL S. SHAPO, SHAPO ON THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12.04[C], at 12-87 - 
12-93 (2013) (discussing statutes limiting retailer liability for product defects). 
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of fairness and responsibility when it imposes liability on perfectly innocent retailers merely 
to serve goals such as compensation or deterrence. In other words, they play on the picture 
of strict retailer liability as regulation and redistribution. As we noted above, Cardozo himself 
accepted the imposition of liability for a dangerous product causing injury in a closed 
container case, but relied upon warranty to do so.56 On this approach, one might be able to 
fashion a justification for strict retailer liability on the ground that a commercial seller’s 
injuring of another person through the sale of a defective product is a distinct, strictly 
defined wrong—one that it is difficult to avoid committing, sooner or later—within the 
family of legal wrongs that constitutes tort law. However, the mythical account of 
MacPherson’s connection to strict liability, which purports to locate that connection in an 
underlying commitment to a regulatory conception of tort liability, cannot take advantage of 
this line of reasoning, and instead renders strict retailer liability vulnerable to the objections 
that have given rise to statutory reforms.  
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that the most impressive judicial movement 
against tort liability in the past two decades has been the Supreme Court’s aggressive 
application of preemption doctrine. In developing this doctrine, the Supreme Court has 
managed to sheer away a significant amount of liability for medical devices and prescription 
drugs and of course some—less systematically—for other products. In our view, both in its 
8-1 decision on medical devices,57 and its 5-4 design defect decision on generic drugs,58 the 
Court managed to enact a sort of back-door tort reform only because of its failure to 
attribute adequate significance to the real differences between defect-based strict products 
liability and negligence law. 
Justice Alito’s Bartlett opinion exemplifies the problem most clearly. Impossibility 
preemption applies only where the requirements of state law and the requirements of federal 
law are impossible to satisfy simultaneously. The defendant, Mutual Pharmaceutical, argued 
that any design defect tort action under New Hampshire state law was inconsistent with the 
federal-law requirement that it design its drug Sulindac to match the brand name drug Clinoril, 
of which Sulindac was a generic version. The respondent, Bartlett, argued that New 
Hampshire products liability law was strict, and therefore not regulatory in a sense that 
constitutes a requirement. On that basis, she argued, impossibility preemption was 
inapplicable. Writing for the Court, Justice Alito disagreed:  
 
 We begin by identifying petitioner’s duties under state law. As an initial matter, 
respondent is wrong in asserting that the purpose of New Hampshire’s design-defect 
cause of action “is compensatory, not regulatory.” Brief for Respondent 19.  Rather, 
New Hampshire’s design-defect cause of action imposes affirmative duties on 
manufacturers. 
 Respondent is correct that New Hampshire has adopted the doctrine of strict 
liability in tort as set forth in Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See 
2 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1963 and 1964) (hereinafter Restatement 
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57 Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008). 
58 Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013). 
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2d). See Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard & Sons, Inc., 110 N. H. 36, 37-39, 260 A. 2d 111, 
112-113 (1969). Under the Restatement — and consequently, under New Hampshire 
tort law — “[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical 
harm thereby caused” even though he “has exercised all possible care in the 
preparation and sale of the product.” Restatement 2d § 402A, at 347-348. 
 But respondent’s argument conflates what we will call a “strict-liability” regime (in 
which liability does not depend on negligence, but still signals the breach of a duty) 
with what we will call an “absolute-liability” regime (in which liability does not reflect 
the breach of any duties at all, but merely serves to spread risk). New Hampshire has 
adopted the former, not the latter. . . . 59  
 
 What is stunning about this passage is that it uses the term “conflates” in place of an 
argument, as if melding together duty-based liability based on the sale of a dangerous 
product and risk-spreading were an intellectual confusion or mistake. A great deal of what 
Greenman and 402A were about was finding a middle ground between a mandate-like 
message for products manufacturers about what care they must take in marketing products, 
on the one hand, and treating them simply as deep pockets or insurers for a group of 
products users, on the other. Traynor, Prosser and others thought there was such a middle 
ground, in which defect-based liability simultaneously spread risk and incentivized safety. 
The Second Restatement and most state courts and legislatures adopted strict products 
liability because they shared that view, at least for manufacturing defects and design defects. 
From our brief study, the courts of New Hampshire largely accepted that view, too. 
 Our two earlier examples—closed container statutes, and the changes wrought by the 
products liability provisions of the Restatement (Third)—help to crystallize the admittedly 
slippery point we are making about Bartlett, and push it one step further. Strict products 
liability in tort, at least for manufacturing defects and design defects and at least in some 
jurisdictions in its first generation, was crafted to serve a compensatory and risk-spreading 
function, but to do so in a qualified way by requiring proof of defect, as opposed to 
imposing ‘absolute’ liability that would extend even to injuries caused by sound products. 
Liability for design defect based on a product’s failure to meet consumer expectations, or 
based on a failure to satisfy a hindsight-based version of the risk-utility test, pursued 
compensation and deterrence by adopting a form of liability that lies somewhere in between 
negligence and absolute liability. That is what strict products liability, at least in its initial 
formulations, was all about.  
 Cardozo on the New York Court of Appeals and Traynor on the Supreme Court of 
California were both great common law judges, but their approaches were not the same. 
Cardozo sought to modernize tort law while remaining true to the idea that torts are not 
merely wrongs in name, but hinge liability on the actual commission of a wrong. Traynor 
fused negligence and warranty so as to eliminate the wrongfulness of a defendant’s conduct 
as a basis for liability, even though liability was still said to sound in ‘tort.’ Insofar as other 
states followed Traynor’s approach, they adopted a qualified liability-rule approach to 
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product-related injuries in which liability does not hinge on the breach, by sellers, of a 
genuine obligation to alter their conduct to avoid causing injuries to consumers. 
Why did Justice Alito and four other members of the Court get this wrong? No 
doubt there is some truth in the standard observation that the ‘right wing’ of the Roberts 
Court is pro-business and friendly to tort reform. But a large part of the answer, we think, 
goes back to a misunderstanding of MacPherson as an early anticipation of late mid-late 
Twentieth Century products liability law. Negligence and strict products liability are 
importantly different. Even if—as we mentioned much earlier in this section—there has 
been substantial success in the effort to preserve a robust law of products liability in the 
United States by pushing it back toward negligence law, this does not undercut our first 
point: it matters whether one has a tenable view of what MacPherson stands for.    
 
CONCLUSION 
  
 Standard accounts of MacPherson’s virtues fail, for they are based on myths: the myth 
that Cardozo rejected relational duty in favor of a simple duty to the public at large; the myth 
that he hid an instrumental policy argument beneath the verbiage of common law decision-
making; and the myth that he endorsed an avowedly instrumental conception of negligence 
that pointed directly to a comparably instrumental conception of strict products liability. The 
myths are not themselves harmful. The problem is what they hide: that relational duty fits 
into the modern world and is essential to a progressive negligence law; how moral and 
pragmatic thinking fit within common law reasoning; and that—even though negligence can 
and does move with the times—the strict products liability envisioned by the likes of 
Traynor in the 1960s and 1970s was its own, special progressive idea. The Legal Realism at 
the root of the myths of MacPherson is not so much pernicious as it is shallow. The 
application of the methods of common law legal reasoning to torts cases is not a charade but 
a challenge. One hundred years after MacPherson v. Buick, there is still plenty we can learn 
from Judge Cardozo about how that challenge is best met. 
  
